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Assistant Professor of Law and Philosophy
My work explores the nature and structure of normativity, and the connections between moral, legal, and epistemic norms. I defend a variety of quasi-realist expressivism about normative thought and talk, and my published work to date includes papers on ethical supervenience (the precise upshot for expressivists); ground-theoretic attempts to distinguish quasi-realism from full-blooded realism about normative truth; and the ethical implications of expressivism. On the ties between the various species of normativity, I argue that legal and moral normativity are conceptually linked, and my published work in this area includes papers arguing that legal reasons are partly moral reasons, that there might be legal reasons to follow the law de dicto, as well as papers exploring the ethics of legal incentives, the convention-dependence of a legally significant class of normative facts, and the role of folk morality in law.
I am currently working on three main projects: a project in epistemology on the nature of perceptual knowledge; a project in naturalistic ethics on the objectivity of moral demands; and a project in analytic jurisprudence on the sources (and limits) of objectivity in law.